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IN THE UTAH COORT OF APPEALS

RALPH PECKHAM,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

Case No. 870403-CA

v.

:

GERALD COOK, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

:

Category No. 3

Defendant-Respondent. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal seeks review of an order of t h e Third
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court for S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utah,
g r a n t i n g the r e s p o n d e n t Warden Gerald L. Cook's c r o s s motion for
summary judgment and d i s m i s s i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t Ralph Peckham's
p e t i t i o n for a w r i t of habeas c o r p u s .
s h a l l be r e f e r r e d
be r e f e r r e d

t o as

M

(Hereafter,

the a p p e l l a n t

the p r i s o n e r " and t h e r e s p o n d e n t

shall

t o as "Warden Cook".)

This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h i s appeal
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. S 7 8 - 2 a - 2 ( f )

(1987).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on t h i s appeal a r e as f o l l o w s :
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(i) Whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-(7)(a) (Supp. 1987)
applies retrospectively or prospectively to the prisoner;
(ii) Whether the prisoner's complaint is barred by a
statute of limitation; and
(iii) Whether the prisoner's factual allegations raised
for the first time on appeal can be considered by this court.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions cited in this brief are set
forth below:
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (Supp. 1987):
No part of these revised statutes is
retroactivef unless expressly so declared.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1987)
Upon completion without violation of 18
months probation in felony or Class B
misdemeanor cases, or six months in Class B.
misdemeanor cases, the probation shall be
terminated, unless earlier terminated by the
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (Supp. 1987):
Within Three Months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been known be
petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about June 3, 1987, almost two years after he
began serving his prison sentence, the prisoner filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(7)(a) applies retrospectively to the date of his initial
probation.

The prisoner subsequently filed a motion for summary
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judgment.

Warden Cook filed a cross motion for summary judgment

and argued that § 77-18-M 7) (a) does not apply retrospectively
and argued that the prisoner's action was barred by the
applicable statute of limitation.

The Honorable Frank G. Noel,

Judge, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, granted Warden Cook's cross motion for summary judgment
and entered an order dismissing the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about July 21, 1983, the prisoner pled guilty to
forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony.

(R. 3) On

September 15, 1983, the prisoner pled guilty to forcible sexual
abuse and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison.

The prisoner

was then placed on probation and the prison term was stayed.
3).

(R.

On March 29, 1985, § 77-18-1(7)(a) Utah Code Ann. (Supp.

1987) became effective.

Prior to the effective date of that

statute, the prisoner had not violated the terms of his
probation.

(R. 3)

In July 1985, the prisoner violated the terms

of his probation and was committed to the Utah State Prison as a
result of that violation.

(R. 3) On or about June 3, 1987, the

prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is
the subject of this appeal.

(R. 3)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Recognized rules of statutory construction require that
unless the legislature declares to the contrary, statutes only
apply prospectively.

Thus when the Utah Legislature enacted §

77-18-1(7)(a) after the prisoner had been placed on probation,
that statute does not apply to him.

-3-

Additionally, long-standing rules have upheld that
statutes of limitation can bar an action after a lapse of time.
Utah's statute of limitation on the writ of habeas corpus
provided a reasonable time and opportunities for the prisoner to
bring an action.

Therefore, the prisoner's delay of almost two

years effectively barred his complaint.
Finally, it is well established that factual issues not
raised to the trial court cannot be considered by appellate
courts.

The prisoner's new factual allegations raised in this

appeal must likewise be rejected.
ARGUMENT
POIHT I
UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-18-1 (7) (a) ONLY APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY
The prisoner argues that pursuant to Utah Code § 77-181(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) his probation should have expired following
18 months of successful compliance with the terms of his
probation.

But because the enactment and effective date of § 77-

18-1(7)(a) was after the prisoner had been placed on probation,
this statute does not apply retrospectively to him.
The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the longstanding principle that unless expressly directed by the
legislature, statutes cannot apply retrospectively.

In Carlucci

v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah
1986), the court said, "The general rule is that the law
establishing substantive rights and liabilities when a cause of
action arises, and not a subsequently enacted statute, governs
the resolution of the dispute."

-4-

The Utah Legislature has specifically statedr unless
declared otherwise, statutes must be applied prospectively.

That

declaration is found in Utah Code Ann. S 68-3-3 (Supp. 1987),
which reads:
No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless eypressly so declared,
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Code does not expressly declare an exception
to the prospective effect of § 77-18-K 7) (a) . Therefore, in
accordance with the general rule and in compliance with the
legislative intent dictated by § 68-3-3, the operation of § 7716-1(7)(a) can only apply prospectively.

Accordingly, the

prisoner's probation was properly revoked and he was rightfully
imprisoned upon the violation of that probation.
POINT II
THE PRISONER'S PETITION IS BARRED BY A STAIPTE OF LIMITATION
The Utah Code contains a specific statute limiting the
length of time in which an action that can be remedied by a writ
of habeas corpus must be filed.

That statute reads:

Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been known by
petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-31.1 (1987) (emphasis added).
The prisoner's probation was revoked in July 1985.
3)

(P.

In order to comply with the statute of limitation, he should

have tiled his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the end ot
September 1985.

The appellant failed to file until June 1987.
•5-

He missed the statutory deadline by approximately 20 months;
consequently, the lower court ruled that the prisoner is barred
from seeking relief by a writ of habeas corpus.
The prisoner argues that the application of the
statutes of limitation is unconstitutional because it violates
both the due process clause and the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution.

He also claims that this statute

violates the Utah Constitution by denying the prisoner access to
the courts and his right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The establishment of statutes of limitations, however,
has been recognized by the United State Supreme Court.

In the

long standing case of Terry v. Anderson. 95 U.S. 628, 632-33
(1877) it was said by Justice Waite:
This Court has often decided that the
statutes of limitations affecting existing
rights are not unconstitutional, if a
reasonable time is given for the commencement
of an action before the bar takes effect.
Admittingly, three months is a short period of time,
but in the context of writs of habeas corpus the time specified
by the legislators is reasonable because of the following:

The

underlying remedy sought by a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is foremost on an inmates mind.

The profound act of being

incarcerated is of such a substantial nature that it cannot go
unnoticed.

Further, prisoners are protected by the

constitutional right ot having access to attorneys and to law
libraries.

£^a, pounds v. Smith. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).

The time

specified by the legislature sufficiently provided the prisoner
with the opportunity to contact an attorney or complete the
minimum research needed to realize he may ot had a claim.
-6-

In addition, the enforcement of the statute is similar
to enforcing the short time limit in which a litigant must file a
notice of appeal.

The penalty for failure to file is harsh, but

the time limit enforces finality to an action.

Concluding that

the statute of limitation tor petitions for writ of habeas corpus
is unconstitutional would have a similar effect on the finality
because it would allow a collateral attack of the underlying case
over an unlimited period of time.
The prisoner's assertions that the enforcement of the
statute denies him the right to petition and the right of access
to the court are without merit.

He still has those rights, but

like any litigant, he must assert these within the statutory
period.
POINT III
THE PRISONER IS BARRED FROM RAISING FACTDAL ISSDES BEFORE THIS
COURT
The prisoner attempts to raise in his appeal an issue
of fact that was not raised at the trial court.

On page 16 of

his brief, the prisoner says that there remains an issue as to
whether the prisoner knew or should have known within the time
prescribed by the statute of limitations that he may have had
grounds for a writ of habeas corpus.
The prisoner may not raise such an issue on appeal.

He

was required under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to raise that issue before the trial court.
says:
When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this Rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere
-7-

Rule 56(e)

allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this Rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
(Emphasis added)
The prisoner chose not to respond to Warden Cook's
cross motion for summary judgment, and accordingly he failed to
"set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial."

Id.

!n Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American
Title Insurance Company, 2 4 Ut. Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Jan. 31,
1988), the Utah Supreme Court refused to consider a factual issue
the appellant in that case failed to present to the trial court.
In rejecting the appellant's factual allegations, the Utah
Supreme Court explained, "This claim has been raised on appeal
for the first time. . . . [W]e do not consider issues that were
not presented to the trial court."

M»

at 13.

The Court then

said, M[W]e conclude that the agency issue is not presented to us
as a question of law, but as a question of fact which may not be
determined on appeal."

Jji. at 14.

Likewise, this court should

not consider the prisoner's factual claim that was never raised
at the trial court.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Warden Cook respectfully
requests that this court affirm the trial court's order granting
the his cross motion for summary judgment.
DATED this /lJ*r

dav of Apjril 1988.
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